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ABSTRACT
Chinese aid in the African agriculture sector is one 
of the enduring forms of involvement on the continent. 
The launching of Agriculture Technology Demonstration 
Centres (ATDCs) in 2006 marked a new intensive phase in 
agricultural aid, which seeks to find sustainability through 
public-private partnerships and to promote Chinese 
commercial pursuits. Based on in-depth fieldwork in 
Mozambique and South Africa, this paper provides a 
critical analysis of ATDCs practices. As per the three key 
objectives of the ATDC - technology transfer, business 
development, and sustainability -, the authors find three 
major results. First, the agro-technology transfer proves 
to be beneficial but at a very localized level. Second, 
Chinese agribusiness companies have been introduced to 
the host countries through the platform of the ATDC, and 
are partially fulfilling the commercial aim of the project. 
Third, the long-standing problem of aid unsustainability 
remains a major concern with the newly launched 
ATDC project. The deficiency of policy design and lack of 
effective bilateral interactions are identified as the main 
reasons for the problems experienced. 
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INTRODUCTION
Chinese agricultural aid in Africa dates back to the late 1950s, and still 
remains an essential part of Chinese contemporary aid towards the conti-
nent. Due to the significance of agriculture to economic development and 
social upliftment, the sector has always been given special priority by the 
Chinese government in its aid pledges. The aims and modalities of Chinese 
agricultural aid in Africa have however undergone substantial changes over 
the last five to six decades. This is particularly the case with the country’s aid 
reforms since the 1980s, which began to put more emphasis on aid perfor-
mance and on serving a wider range of foreign policy objectives. 
The Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre (‘the ATDC’ or ‘the 
Centre’ hereinafter), a flagship project of Chinese contemporary agricultural 
aid programme in Africa, is a key institutional expression of this transfor-
mation of Chinese foreign aid. It combines both diplomatic and commercial 
goals, involves a diversity of public and private actors, and adopts a com-
plicated operational mechanism. Furthermore, it represents an innovative 
dimension of Chinese agricultural aid, in that it is a hybrid of different forms 
of aid programming previously utilised (e.g. farms, agro-technology demon-
stration/extension stations, experts dispatch), with some of the mechanisms 
being intentionally designed to avoid problems experienced in the past.
While the ATDC project has attracted wide attention from both domes-
tic and international observers since its inception in 2006, there has been a 
dearth of fieldwork-based research conducted in this arena. Of the existing 
research, most has concentrated on policy analysis and captured only the 
inception phase of the projects (Xu and Qin, 2011; Tang, 2013; Scoones, et 
al. eds., 2013; Tang, et al., 2014; Chichava, et al., 2014). The way the ATDCs 
are implemented, how the different Centres operate and the dynamics of 
these Centres over time have not been the focus of studies to date. 
In short, in order to obtain a fuller insight into the Chinese agricultural 
aid programme, it is necessary to analyse the ATDC operations over the 
past ten years and to provide a comparative investigation into functioning 
ATDCs in different country settings. Specifically, this paper aims to: first, 
study the objectives and modalities (actors and operational mechanisms) of 
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the ATDC project; second, analyse the actual practice of the ATDC through 
in-depth case studies of the ATDCs in two Southern African countries: Mo-
zambique and South Africa; third, provide some policy recommendations 
to improve the ATDC performance. 
Three sources of data informed this qualitative research. Primary data 
was collected through a semi-structured questionnaire-based survey. 
Through a combination of purposive and chain referral sampling, 10 in-
terviews were conducted for the ATDC in Mozambique and 22 interviews 
were conducted for the ATDC in South Africa. The interviewees involved 
stakeholders from both the Chinese and host-country sides, covering the 
Chinese staff working in the ATDCs, the Mozambican and South African 
officials, staff and workers. Observational data was obtained, during the sur-
vey period, through site visits, allowing an understanding about the physical 
setting. Finally, secondary data including documentation regarding plans, 
project structure and project governance were collected from both public 
sources and the interviewees in order to corroborate the findings from in-
terviews and observations. All fieldwork was conducted in Mozambique 
over a period from October 2013 to January 2015 and in South Africa from 
April 2013 to January 2015.
This paper is organized in five sections. Section I outlines the general 
picture of the ATDC project, examining its objectives, actors and mecha-
nisms. Section II and III investigate the specific cases of the ATDCs in Mo-
zambique and South Africa, respectively. Section IV provides an integrated 
analysis of three key topics: technology transfer, business introduction and 
sustainable development. Finally, section V, provides conclusions and policy 
implications. 
SECTION I. ATDC: OBJECTIVES, 
ACTORS AND MECHANISMS
The ATDC project was first proposed at the Beijing Summit of the 3rd 
FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation) in 2006. The Chinese gov-
ernment pledged to build 10 ATDCs in different African countries (FO-
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CAC, 2006). The number was then increased to 20 during the 4th FOCAC 
of 2009 (FOCAC, 2009). By 2012, there had been in practice at least 23 Chi-
nese-aided ATDCs, with the first 14 centres having finished construction 
and been transferred to the host governments, and nine others still in the 
process of completing a feasibility study or construction (Table 1). 
Objectives
According to the official document which guides the practice of the AT-
DCs (‘ATDC Guidance’ hereinafter), issued jointly by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the purposes of the 
ATDCs are explained as follows (MOC and MOA, 2011):
I. To serve China’s foreign strategy and promote bilateral relations with 
the recipient countries;
II. To help increase grain production, improve agricultural technology, 
and enhance food security of the recipient countries;
III. To provide a platform for Chinese companies to develop in Africa, 
and promote China’s ‘Agricultural Going Out’ policy;
IV. To build the ATDC into a base for agro-technology experiment and 
research, demonstration and extension, human resources training, and dis-
play.
Based on the ATDC Guidance, the objectives of the ATDC project can 
be interpreted mainly from two aspects. First, ATDCs are launched pri-
marily for political/diplomatic considerations and act first and foremost as 
a Chinese government aid project in Africa (Objective I & II). The aim is 
to improve food security of the recipient countries through the transfer of 
Chinese advanced agro-technology (Objective IV), and thereby, to consol-
idate and strengthen the ‘traditional friendship’ between China and Africa. 
Specifically, the agro-technology transfer is expected to be realised by the 
execution of four functions: research, demonstration and extension, train-
ing, and display (Objective IV). These are also termed by the Chinese gov-
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ernment as ‘public-interest functions’ (gongyixing gongneng) in that they 
are all supposed to be non-commercial activities. 
Second, ATDCs project bear some commercial elements. This is a new 
feature compared to China’s earlier agricultural aid practice in Africa and 
this is in in line with the country’s aid reforms since the 1980s2. Most prom-
inently, the commercial elements are manifested through the intention of 
establishing business platforms for Chinese agro-companies (Objective III), 
which is termed as business introduction in this paper. Also, similar to the 
practice of Chinese contemporary aid in general, the ATDC project is ac-
companied by and expected to promote export of Chinese agro-equipment 
and materials, among others (MOC and MOA, 2012). 
Actors
The Chinese government incorporates Chinese companies, both state-
owned and private, in the management of the ATDCs3. This demonstrates 
an element of government-company cooperation, and, in the case of private 
firms, a Public Private Partnership (PPP) model. To be qualified to operate 
and manage an ATDC, the companies, in principle, have to be national or 
provincial-level leading agro-companies in China and must have strong fi-
nancial, managerial, and technical capabilities. The companies need to go 
through a bidding process - though not a fully open or competitive one – 
with the local and central Chinese governments having influence over the 
decision-making (Tang et al., 2014). No private actors from the host coun-
tries are currently involved in the implementation of the ATDCs.
While the Chinese company actors (referred to as the “implementing 
agents” hereinafter) are the main role players in the daily operation of the 
2 Important reform measures in the 1980s include, for instance, incorporation of company 
actors through the “contract and responsibility system” and strengthening of the post-transfer 
technical and management cooperation of aid projects, which primarily aimed at improving the aid 
efficiency and sustainability. More commercial-oriented reform started from the mid-1990s. Aid 
was increasingly used as an instrument to serve China’s economic foreign policy objectives, for 
example, through promoting foreign trade and investment. The aid financing channels were also 
diversified with more market capital (e.g. bank loans and company funds) being utilized.
3 There are also several cases, for instance, in Congo, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 1), 
that the ATDCs are run by Chinese universities or research institutes. They sometimes also register 
a company under their names to operate the Centre.
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ATDCs, they also work in conjunction with several government agen-
cies of both China and the host countries. The Chinese MOC and MOA, 
central-level government actors on the Chinese side, are predominantly 
involved in the macro planning, facilitating and supervising the ATDC 
project. In most cases, each of the ATDC-recipient countries is twinned 
with one specific province (or provincial-level city) in China (Table 1), des-
ignated by the Chinese central government (MOC and MOA, 2011). Apart 
from providing general support for the implementation of the project, the 
local Chinese governments are expected to play a leading role in promoting 
agro-companies from their province to invest in the twinned African coun-
try (MOC and MOA, 2011). On the recipient side, various counterpart gov-
ernment agencies are involved in the implementation of the ATDC, which 
vary in the different African countries.
Mechanisms
Each ATDC has three operational stages: Project Construction Stage, 
Technical Cooperation Stage and Business Operation Stage4. The Project 
Construction Stage normally takes about one year. While the host govern-
ment provides logistical support such as providing land, electricity and wa-
ter, the Chinese side is in charge of the construction of infrastructure and 
the provision of agro-equipment and materials. The construction is execut-
ed by Chinese companies, but in most cases involves, to different degrees, 
employment of local workers in the host countries. The majority of the fees 
incurred in this stage are underwritten by the Chinese government, which 
averages about 40 million RMB (approximately $660,000) for each of the 
Centres. (MOC and MOA, 2011; the authors’ fieldwork) 
Once the construction is completed, the ATDC is transferred to the host 
government and becomes a state asset of the latter. This also usually indi-
cates the commencement of the three-year Technical Cooperation Stage. 
The main tasks for the ATDC in this stage are to perform the four ‘pub-
  4 Prior to the commencement of any stages, an exchange letter is signed between the two 
respective governments. The letter typically sets out the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
governments and implementing companies, particularly in the Project Construction Stage and the 
Technical Cooperation Stage.
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lic-interest functions’ mentioned earlier: agro-technology research, demon-
stration and extension, training and display. A Chinese technical team is 
assigned to the Centre to undertake these tasks. Moreover, in fulfilment of 
the ‘business introduction’ objective, the Centre also acts as a platform for 
Chinese agro-companies, who are seeking agribusiness opportunities into 
the host country. This latter dimension is fundamental because through it 
the Centre starts planning and setting the basis for the succeeding Busi-
ness Operation Stage. To do that, many of the ATDCs set up small-scale 
agribusinesses based on the Centre in preparation for the business-oriented 
operation in the future (MOC and MOA, 2011; the authors’ fieldwork).
In the Technical Operation Stage, in terms of the management, the Chi-
nese implementing company runs the Centre on the daily basis. Financially, 
the Chinese government covers most of the Centre’s daily operations, in-
cluding the funds needed to carry out the routine activities such as agro-re-
search, demonstration and training, as well as the salary of the Chinese 
staff. The host government plays the role of a facilitator, assisting to varying 
degrees with the technical and managerial issues and also sharing a small 
part of the financing responsibility related to this (MOC and MOA, 2011; 
the authors’ fieldwork).
When the three-year technical cooperation ends, the ATDC enters the 
Business Operation Stage5. In this stage, the Centre is expected to be able to 
establish a market-oriented, integrated agribusiness value chain. Meanwhile, 
the original ‘public-interest functions’ are supposed to remain and even to 
be expanded and diversified. As far as it was designed in the ATDC Guid-
ance, the Chinese companies will continue taking full charge of the Centre’s 
management at the Business Operation Stage. Financially, the Chinese gov-
ernment only covers the operational fees of the ATDCs for the first three 
years of technical cooperation; afterwards, the Centre should try to fund 
itself through incomes from the business operation (Xu and Qin, 2011). The 
5 Different from the description of the former two stages that is combined by both policy 
documents survey and the authors’ fieldwork, the description of the Business Operation Stage is 
mostly based on policy documents (esp. the ATDC Guidance); that is, more from a policy design 
point of view. This is because by early 2015 when the last-time fieldwork was conducted, most of 
the first 14 ATDCs had just entered or were about to enter this stage (Table 1), thus little empirical 
evidence was available at that moment.
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specific roles and responsibilities of the local partners were not specified in 
the ATDC Guidance and thus need to be further negotiated on the ground 
on a case-specific basis (MOC and MOA, 2011).
While this stage is also in line with the ‘business introduction’ objec-
tive, the primary purpose of having a prolonged cooperation period and 
adopting the business model is to ensure the sustainable development of 
the ATDC. Again, this has much to do with China’s aid reforms since the 
1980s. One of the important reform measures that aimed to improve the aid 
sustainability was to strengthen ‘management cooperation’ in the post-con-
struction phase. The management cooperation may take different forms 
such as sole management by the Chinese side on a entrustment or lease term 
(given that after transfer the project is part of the host country’s assets), or 
co-management through joint venture created by both sides (Shi 1989; State 
Council 2011)6. Either a Chinese-led or joint venture way of management 
could be applied to the ATDC project. It could also be, in theory, an inde-
pendent management by the recipient side as long as the recipient country 
is capable of operating the Centre on their own. The specific cooperation 
model, particularly the unspecified responsibilities of the local partners, is 
to be negotiated between the two sides as the Technical Cooperation Stage 
nears the end. The original plan as seen in the ATDC Guidance, however, 
seems to suggest a Chinese-led management model.
In the following sections, the case studies will be focusing particularly 
on technology transfer, business introduction and sustainable development, 
the three aspects that have been identified earlier (as highlighted in Part I) 
as the core goals of the ATDCs.
SECTION II. CASE STUDY: ATDC 
IN MOZAMBIQUE
The China-Mozambique Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre 
(‘the Mozambican ATDC’ or ‘the centre’ hereinafter) was one of the first 14 
ATDCs that were put into practice (Table 1). It was launched by the then 
  6 Also see footnote 2.
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Table 1 Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa
No Host Country Chinese Implementing Agent(s) Area 
(Ha)
Cooperation Fields
The 14 ATDCs that have been transferred to the host governments
1 Benin China National Agricultural Development Group C: 2009–2010
T: 2010–2013
B: 2014–
51.6 Grains (e.g. maize), vegetables, 
livestock (e.g. chicken)
2 Cameroon Shanxi province
Shanxi State Farms and Land Reclamation Group
[TS: Northwest Agriculture and Forestry Technology Univer-
sity]
C: 2009–2010
T: 2013–2016
B: 2016–
100 Rice
3 Republic of Congo Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences C: 2009–2011
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
59 Grains (e.g. maize, cassava), 
vegetables, livestock (e.g. chicken); 
fodder production and processing; 
agricultural mechanisation
4 Ethiopia Guangxi province
Guangxi Bagui Agricultural Science and Technology
[TS: Guangxi Agricultural Vocational College]
C: 2010–2012
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
52 Grains, vegetables and livestock 
(e.g. pigs, cows and chicken)
5 Liberia Hunan province
Longping High-tech Agriculture
C: 2009–2010
T: 2010–2014
B: 2014–
32.6 Hybrid rice
6 Mozambique Hubei province
Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development
C: 2009–2010
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
52 Grains (e.g. maize
7 Rwanda Fujian province
Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University
C: 2009–2011
T: 2011–2014
B: 2014–
22.6 Grains, mulberry plantation and 
silkworm keeping, jun-cao cultiva-
tion, water-conservancy
8 South Africa China National Agricultural Development Group 
[TS: Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences]
C: 2009–2011
T: 2014–2017
B: 2017–
0.47 Freshwater aquaculture
9 Sudan Shandong province
Shandong International Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Group  [TS: Shandong Academy of Agricultural Sciences]
C: 2009–2011
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
65 Grains (e.g. wheat, maize), vegeta-
bles, cotton, peanuts; water-con-
servancy
10 Tanzania Chongqing Municipality
Chongqing Seed Group
[TS: Chongqing Academy of Agricultural Sciences]
C: 2009–2010
T: 2011–2014
B: 2015–
62 Grains (e.g. rice, maize, soybeans), 
vegetables, flowers, livestock (e.g. 
chicken)
11 Togo Jiangxi province
Huachang International Economic and Technical Corporation
C: 2009–2011
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
10 Rice,maize
12 Uganda Sichuan province
HuaqiaoFenghuang Group
C: 2009–2010
T: 2011–2014
B: 2015–
0..3 Freshwater aquaculture
The 14 ATDCs that have been transferred to the host governments
13 Zambia Jilin province
Jilin Agriculture University
C: 2010–2011
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
120 Grains (e.g. wheat, maize, soy-
beans), vegetables; agricultural 
mechanisation
14 Zimbabwe Chinese Academy of Agricultural Mechanization Sciences
(Menoble)
C: 2009–2011
T: 2012–2015
B: 2015–
109 Agricultural mechanisation and 
irrigation
The 9 ATDCs that are still under negotiation or construction
15 Angola Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps MOUsignedin 2012
16 Central Africa Republic TBC MOUsignedin 2012
17 Cote d’Ivoire TBC Feasibility study conducted in 2012
18 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
ZTE Energy Foundation ceremony held in 2012
19 Equatorial Guinea Ganliang Feasibility study conducted in2011
20 Eritrea Shanghai Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation 
Group 
Feasibility study conducted in 2012
21 Malawi China Africa Cotton Foundation ceremony held in 2012
22 Mali Zijinhua Agreement signed in 2012
23 Mauritania Mudanjiang Yanlinzhuanyuan Technology Foundation ceremony held in 2012
Source: Made by the authors based on media reports and fieldwork. (C: Project Construction, T: Technology Cooperation, B: Business Operation, TS: Technical Support)
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Chinese president Hu Jintao during his state visit to Mozambique in 2007. 
A Chinese delegation was then assigned by the Chinese MOA to conduct a 
feasibility study. With the assistance of the Ministério de Agricultura (MI-
NAG) and Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia (MCT) of Mozambique, both 
sides finally chose a location for the centre in Boane, 23km southeast of 
Maputo. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese company, Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural 
Development Company (‘Lianfeng’ hereinafter) was selected as the imple-
menting agent to take full charge of the centre’s construction and manage-
ment. Lianfeng is a provincial-level state farming company affiliated with 
the Bureau of State Farms and Land Reclamation (BSFLR) under the Hubei 
provincial government of China. The construction of the centre started in 
2009 and finished in 2010. In July 2011, the ATDC was formally transferred 
to the Mozambican government. From April 2012, the centre entered into 
the Technical Cooperation Stage.
On the Mozambican side, MCT was the designated authority in charge 
of assisting in technical and managerial issues of the centre on the daily 
basis. In addition, the MINAG and IIAM, Instituto de Investigação Agrária 
de Mozambique, also played an assisting role (Interview, 14 Nov 2013).7 
According to one performance evaluation conducted by the Chinese MOC 
in 2013, the Mozambican ATDC was ranked the first among 15 ATDCs that 
were in operation (Zhang and Zhang, 2015).
Technology Transfer
Agro-technology transfer occurred in two main areas, crop farming 
(e.g. rice, maize, vegetables) and animal husbandry (e.g. pig farming), which 
were decided based on the local conditions and bilateral negotiation (Inter-
views, 4 Nov 2013-b and 8 Nov 2013). Trainees were selected from the ten 
provinces across the country by the Mozambican MCT and MINAG8, and 
 7 For more detail on the mechanisms and problems regarding the government actors on the 
Mozambican side, see Chichava, Durán and Jiang, 2014. 
8 Most of the trainees were selected by the local branches of the MCT and MINAG in different 
provinces from farmers who were registered with the local agricultural associations. In some 
other cases, independent farmers who were not registered may also be selected. There were 
no specific selection criteria, as responded by the interviewee, apart from the trainees’ health 
conditions (Interview, 14 Nov 2013).
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fell into three categories: farmers, technicians and officials. Among them, 
ordinary smallholder farmers were given the greatest emphasis: around 6-7 
training sessions are arranged per year for them with each session lasting for 
10 days. They were taught basic and practical farming techniques, which are 
easily implemented. For the technicians, 3 one-month training sessions were 
organised every year, with courses designed at a higher level covering rice 
breeding techniques and field management, amongst others. The centre also 
trained agricultural officials, at a lower frequency, with only three to five day 
sessions per year, which revolved mostly around management matters. In 
addition, the centre provided study and internship opportunities to college 
students, lasting from several weeks up to 6 months (Interviews, 18 Oct 
2013, 4 Nov 2013-a, and 14 Nov 2013).
The training adopted a combined method of in-class teaching and field-
work. However, courses remained flexible to counteract various challenges 
experienced in providing the training. One of the biggest challenges was 
the language barrier that existed between the Chinese agro-experts and the 
trainees. To overcome this, various alternative teaching methods had been 
developed, including providing bilingual (English/Portuguese) hand-outs 
and picture illustrations as well as involving the staff from MCT or IIAM 
in the teaching process. In addition, given that the farmers often had little 
agro-technology experience or low levels of education, the experts faced 
difficulties in explaining some of the agro-technologies, especially when ac-
companied by theoretical contents. To counter this, they had, for instance, 
re-adjusted the courses by reducing theoretical content while strengthening 
the in-field training (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 14 Nov 2013).
The funding for the training was mainly provided by the Chinese gov-
ernment, with the Mozambican government playing a minor role (e.g. the 
transportation and accommodation costs of the trainees) (Interview 14 Nov 
2013). During the first two years of the technical cooperation stage, be-
tween 2012 and 2013, more than 700 Mozambican farmers, technicians and 
officials received training at the centre (Interview 18 Oct 2013). A formal 
follow-up or feedback mechanism did not exist, mainly due to the lack of 
finance (Interview, 14 Nov 2013). However, basic feedback from the farmer 
trainees showed that their production had increased and in some cases more 
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than doubled, due to the knowledge gained from the courses (Interviews, 4 
Nov 2013-a and 14 Nov 2013).
The Mozambican ATDC also conducted basic research activities, pri-
marily on seed testing, during the Technical Cooperation Stage. By 2013 
the centre had tested more than 100 different crop varieties, both Chinese 
and local types (Interview, 8 Nov 2013). However, there were some disa-
greements around the seed testing. The Mozambican side hoped that the 
centre could test more local varieties (Interview, 14 Nov 2013; Chichava et 
al., 2014). On the other hand, the Chinese experts believed that their main 
responsibility was to introduce more good, high-yield Chinese varieties into 
the host country as the technology transfer objective suggests. Also, they 
expressed the difficulty to gain the local seeds given the fact that there were 
very few seed suppliers on the market, and they did not think their Mo-
zambican partners had done enough in terms of providing, or facilitating 
the access to local varieties for testing (Interviews, 4 Nov 2013-a and 8 Nov 
2013).  Considering this, it did not seem to be adequate communication 
between the two sides around this issue. 
Business introduction
The Mozambican ATDC had to a large extent achieved the business in-
troduction objective. This can be seen from three main aspects. First, Lian-
feng, the project-implementing company, started an agribusiness based on 
the centre. It developed crop and animal production by using the land of 
the centre (approximately 50 ha) and distributed the output into the local 
market. Lianfeng also identified seed production, both Chinese and Mo-
zambican varieties, as a potential viable business opportunity due to the 
insufficient supply on the local market, as well as Lianfeng’s expertise in 
seed production (Interviews, 18 Oct 2013 and 8 Nov 2013). In addition, the 
company have planned to provide paid agro-technical extension services 
once the three-year Technical Cooperation Stage is over9 (Interview, 18 Oct 
9  However, Lianfeng clearly realised that, for that to happen, support from the Mozambican 
government, for example, in the form of giving agro-subsidies to the farmers, is required, as 
it is envisaged that these services would be uneconomical to the majority of the local farmers 
(Interview, 18 Oct 2013).
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2013).  Second, apart from the business enterprises based on the ATDC, 
Lianfeng also participated in a couple of agribusiness projects in other prov-
inces of Mozambique, in collaboration with private agro-companies from 
Hubei.
Third, the Mozambican ATDC worked closely with other Chinese 
agro-companies and individuals, providing information and technical 
support that facilitates their investment. An individual agro-investor from 
Shandong province of China, for instance, visited the centre regularly to 
seek technical guidance on his 300 ha rice field near Maputo (Interviews, 29 
Dec 2014-a and 14 Jan 2015). Wanbao, another Hubei company producing 
rice in the Gaza province of Mozambique, also gained from the centre’s as-
sistance, particularly in its initial period of investment, including such as the 
selection of the project site and the rice variety (Interview, 4 Nov 2013-b). 
As commented by the manager of a state-owned agricultural enterprise, ‘If 
we find our investment works a bit easier here, this should be attributed to 
the ATDC’ (Interview, 10 Jan 2015).
Sustainable development
The three-year Technical Cooperation Stage for the Mozambican ATDC 
was due to end in May 2015. Future development plans, specifically con-
cerning the Business Operation Stage, for the centre had yet to be finalised 
between the two governments by the time the fieldwork was conducted in 
early 2015. The general feeling from the Chinese side, however, was that the 
Mozambican counterpart was probably not capable of operating the centre 
independently. A very likely scenario seemed to be that the Mozambican 
ATDC would have an extension of the Technical Cooperation Stage for an-
other three years, as already requested by the Mozambican government. In 
this case, Lianfeng would continue to run and manage the centre (Interview 
29 Dec 2014-b).
Financially, although the centre had been able to earn economic profits 
on its own terms and had a business expansion plan for the future, the prof-
its which had been and would be gained from the commercial operation 
were not sufficient to cover the running costs of the centre. This is primarily 
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21
due to the limited resources the centre has – only around 50 hectares of land 
and a handful of staff (Interview 29 Dec 2014-b).
From the managerial point of view, although the Mozambican side had 
contributed greatly in the centre’s training activities, they had not fully par-
ticipated in the management process. Despite the fact that positions and 
offices were made available to the Mozambicans, they only worked part-
time10 and, in fact, went to the centre only when they had specific problems 
that needed to be addressed. Partly in response to the ‘lack of transparency’ 
criticism by the Mozambican side (Interview, 14 Nov 2013), the Chinese 
had negotiated with the Mozambican government several times and final-
ly managed to persuade them to dispatch at least three staff to the centre. 
However, due to a number of bureaucratic reasons, there were still no Mo-
zambican staff working at the centre (Interview, 4 Nov 2013-a). The lack of 
local participation made it challenging for the Mozambican side to operate 
the centre independently.
SECTION III. CASE STUDY: 
ATDC IN SOUTH AFRICA
The China-South Africa Agriculture Technology Demonstration Cen-
tre (‘the South African ATDC’ or ‘the centre’ hereinafter) was also one of 
the first 14 ATDCs (Table 1). In 2007, the feasibility study was completed 
and the site of the centre was chosen by the South African government at 
Gariep Dam in the central province of the Free State. The construction of 
the centre commenced in 2009 and finished in 2011. In October 2013, the 
final exchange letter11 was signed between the two sides, signifying all the 
preparation work for was complete (Harding, 2014). From February 2014, 
the ATDC formally entered the Technical Cooperation Stage (Interview, 29 
Jan 2015).
China National Agricultural Development Corporation (CNADC) was 
the implementing agent designated by the Chinese government to man-
10 For they also need to work for the MCT.
11 See footnote 4.
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age the centre in the Technical Cooperation Stage12. CNADC is a leading 
agro-company in China and one of the 112 Chinese central-level SOEs 
(State-owned Enterprises). More specifically, it is China Agriculture Inter-
national Development Co Ltd. (CAIDC), one of CNADC’s subsidiaries, that 
took the actual responsibility of running the centre. CAIDC also worked 
closely with FFRC, China Freshwater Fish Research Centre, with the latter 
dispatching aqua-experts and providing technical support to the centre.
On the South African side, the most relevant actors are the Free State 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (FSDARD), the South 
African National Department of Agriculture, and the Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF). During the Technical Cooperation Stage (now in execution), these 
actors play a supportive role. Once this stage ends in 2017, these actors are 
expected to run the centre independently.
Technology Transfer
The focus of the South African ATDC is on freshwater aquaculture. 
The FSDARD selected the trainees based on three categories: smallholder 
farmers, technicians or extension officers and government officials (Hard-
ing, 2014). During 2014, the first year of the Technical Cooperation Stage, 
nine training sessions were held, with 165 trainees attending the courses. 
The majority of the trainees (100) were smallholder farmers working for 
six government-backed fish farms in the Free State. The extension officers 
and technicians (65), from different districts of the Free State, were trained 
prior to the farmers. These officers had played an important role in assisting 
the Chinese experts with technology extension. In addition, the centre also 
formed a cooperation programme with the University of Free State, with 
the objective of giving lectures and providing training courses to college 
students (Interview, 29 Jan 2015).
The training courses combined both in-class teaching and fieldwork. In 
the case of the smallholder farmers, the experts also went to the fish farms 
to give assistance on practical issues, such as adjusting water temperature in 
the ponds and feeding schedule, or in the case of those government-backed 
12 The construction of the centre was contracted to another Chinese company.
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farms, assisting in substantiating smallholder claims for improved technol-
ogy to local government. 
In general, based on the feedback from the smallholder farmers, the 
training provided was well received. Through it, for instance, recipients 
became aware of the importance of water temperature and quality, and 
the effects of these factors on the growth rate of the fish (Interview, 30 Jan 
2015-c). However, the training process faced certain difficulties. First, the 
farmers did not have access to the technologies used in the centre, in their 
farms. Therefore, the techniques could not be implemented on their own 
fish farms. Second, there was a communication barrier between the Chinese 
aqua-experts and the local trainees. In addition, the experts had difficulties 
explaining the technicalities of fish farming. This was a challenge especial-
ly in the cases where the recipients had no previous experience or broad 
knowledge of fish farming.
The centre also begun with some preliminary research activities with 
the view of scaling up in 2015-16. Research topics ranged from feeds and 
nutrition, fish health and disease, water quality, breeding and genetics to 
production systems, market analysis and transportation. The plan was to 
incorporate local institutes, such as the University of Free State and the Ag-
ricultural Research Council of South Africa, into the research agenda, to 
provide them access to the facilities of the centre (Interview, 30 Jan 2015-b).
Business Introduction
Different from the general design for ATDCs by the Chinese govern-
ment, the business operation was not one of the chief concerns for the centre 
in South Africa (Interview, 8 Mar 2015) because no business plans for the 
centre were developed in the exchange letters13.  However, plans still needed 
to be developed in order to deal with the output of the centre. Considering 
this, few options were proposed by the South African ATDC. For instance, 
the fish could be sold on the open markets, but mainly to the Chinese com-
13 This may have something to do with the plan of transferring the management to South 
Africa after the Technical Cooperation Stage. Hence, there was no urgent need for the centre to 
develop commercial activities with an aim to finance itself in the long run.
 The Public SPhere  |  2016 issue
24
munities in Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria, given that Chinese 
citizens have the dietary habit of eating freshwater fish (Interview, 29 Jan 
2015). Moreover, a private South African company had plans to open a fish 
processing plant near the centre, and the fish output from the ATDC and 
the government-backed fish farms could then feed into the fish processing 
plant. The output from the plant could supply the hospitals, schools and 
police stations within the country or be exported overseas, particularly to 
China (Harding, 2014). Although there was not an explicit business plan 
based on the centre itself, the Chinese staff, from the CAIDC, had been 
collecting information on the local investment environment and keeping 
their Beijing-based headquarter regularly updated (Interview, 8 Mar 2015), 
which may help smooth the way for their future investment in South Africa. 
Sustainable Development
There was not yet a final agreement as to the future development after 
the three-year technical cooperation by early 2015, but according to the pre-
liminary exchange letters, the ATDC will be handed over to the FSDARD in 
February 2017. The management team from the CAIDC will be replaced by 
the South Africans, while the Chinese technical team may stay if requested 
by the South African side until February 2020. Financially, the FSDARD will 
be responsible for all costs relating to the centre once Technical Cooperation 
Stage ends (South African ATDC, 2013).
The centre had five full-time positions for South Africans. At least two 
of these local staff, one research assistant and one freshwater scientist, lived 
in the centre and worked closely with the Chinese concerning both admin-
istrative and technical issues. The Chinese also kept in contact with several 
government officials from the FSAARD for the daily operation of the centre 
(Interview, 30 Jan 2015-a). This should help to some extent assure the man-
agement and technical sustainability of the centre after the handover. How-
ever, as seen in Table 2, all major positions were filled by the Chinese, with 
the South African staff playing a supportive role. Moreover, the majority of 
the staff were yet to be employed permanently at the centre by the time of 
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the fieldwork in early 2015. These aspects represented a relevant risk for the 
managerial sustainability of the centre.
Table 2 Governance Structure for the South African ATDC
Human Resources Nationality Responsibilities
Project Manager Chinese Overall operation and management of 
the Centre
Deputy Project 
Manager
South African Manage and arrange the facility, strategic 
planning, assistance to project manager
Technology Officer Chinese Oversee hatchery related issues: in 
charge of fry production, technology 
demonstration and personnel training
Deputy Technology 
Officer
South African Assist with hatchery related activities
Financial Officer Chinese Financial planning and monitoring of 
expenses
Administrative 
Officer
South African Ensure all administrative work is com-
pleted
Source: Made by authors from interviews.
SECTION IV. INTEGRATED ANALYSIS
Technology Transfer
Overall, the Chinese agro-technology transfer through the ATDCs 
proves to be beneficial to the local communities in the host countries. The 
training courses were designed by the Chinese agro-experts according to 
the specific needs of the different types of trainees, and tailored to the actual 
abilities of the latter due to the knowledge gap between the trainers and 
trainees. Moreover, the participation of the local partners helped overcome 
language barrier limitations, and improved the effects of the technology 
transfer. Also, from the feedback perspective, the farmer trainees, for in-
stance, confirmed that the Chinese agro-techniques were useful and could 
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help increase the outputs, as seen in both the cases of Mozambique and 
South Africa.
Nevertheless, the impacts of the technology transfer are to some extent 
limited, mainly for three reasons. The first problem concerns the design 
of the training model. In both cases, the majority of the trainees are the 
smallholder farmers. This is surely sensible in that by transferring farm-
ing techniques to the actual agricultural producers, it would have the most 
direct results. However, the potential benefits are reduced, both in quality 
and quantity terms, as the technology transfer is largely not connected to 
the host country’s agro-technology extension system. Indeed, by training 
more local agro-extension officers, they could better digest the Chinese 
techniques given their professional backgrounds and have a greater impact 
on disseminating the information to farmers due to the elimination of com-
munication barriers (between the extension officers and local farmers) and 
the links to their broader extension networks, including follow-up extension 
and support services. 
In the case of South Africa, there were a handful of local extension of-
ficers and technicians trained at the centre who turned out to play a positive 
role in coordinating the technology transfer between the Chinese and local 
farmers. In contrast, in Mozambique, where a long-standing national agri-
cultural extension system does exist, the Chinese ATDC did not seem to be 
linked to an extension system in any meaningful way. This is because no ex-
tension officers had been involved in the training (Interview, 14 Nov 2013), 
and even the ‘agro-technicians’ who received the training were mostly office 
staff without a mandate to work in the fields (Interview, 18 Oct 2013). The 
detachment with the country’s extension systems implies that the effects 
the centre has might be only moderate and less durable, despite the fact that 
hundreds of small farmers were being trained each year.
Another problem concerns the post-training application. Even if the 
technology transfer process per se could be successful, it may not necessarily 
change the livelihood of the farmers, unless they have enabling environment 
whereby they can put the techniques into application. In Mozambique, al-
though we did not manage to interview the farmer trainees of the ATDC 
(as they were scattered all over the country), a reference example of anoth-
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er Chinese firm engaged in transferring Chinese rice-farming techniques 
to the locals, can be provided. In this case, the techniques taught by the 
Chinese experts could not be implemented due to a lack of tools and irri-
gation equipment, thus the training courses had no sustainable effects on 
the farmers’ livelihood (Interview, 18 Nov 2013). Similarly, in the case of 
South Africa, the heating systems on the six government-backed fish farms, 
which were fundamental to apply the techniques that were taught, were left 
broken for months, causing stunted growth of the fish and reduced profits 
(Interview, 30 Jan 2015-c). 
A potential challenge also lies in the different farming cultures. It takes 
time for the African smallholder farmers to learn and get used to the Chi-
nese/Asian way of intensive cultivation that emanates from the land con-
straints in the region (Interview, 18 Oct 2013). Furthermore, it could be 
difficult for the African farmers, who are used to an extensive way of farm-
ing, to stick to the more technically demanding and more time-consuming 
Chinese techniques on their own, reducing the potential effects of the tech-
nology transfer14.
Although the ‘research’ aspect of the technology transfer is not treated 
as the main focus of the ATDCs, there are still some problems worth noting. 
Take the seed testing for example, while the selected, more productive seed 
varieties would be able to increase the outputs, the suitability of those varie-
ties to the local taste seemed to be neglected. This is the case in both ATDCs: 
in Mozambique where the seed testing was largely restricted to Chinese va-
rieties due to the unavailability of local seeds, and in the South African case 
where the market for freshwater fish was relatively small and specialized. 
Business Introduction
As seen in the cases of Mozambique and South Africa, apart from per-
forming the core function of agro-technology transfer, both centres had 
started or planned to start market-oriented production activities. This 
can be seen as a form of business introduction, although the primary pur-
14 The dilapidation of the Chinese-aided farms in Sierra Leone during the 1970-80s provides a 
vivid illustration to this point (Bräutigam, 2009: 238).
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pose of the commercialised operation of the centre was to maintain the 
project sustainability. More essentially, both Chinese companies, Lianfeng 
and CAIDC, had either set up separate agribusinesses or had been actively 
seeking external agro-investment opportunities by using the ATDC project 
as a springboard. 
Indeed, available data suggests that at least eight out of the first batch 
of 14 Chinese-aided ATDCs in Africa, specifically in Uganda, Zambia, Su-
dan, Mozambique, Cameroon, Liberia, Malawi and Benin, have successfully 
established their independent agribusiness outside the ATDCs (Table 1). 
Furthermore, the Mozambican case has demonstrated a greater role of the 
ATDC as a business platform through providing information and technical 
support to Chinese companies and individuals, thus facilitating their local 
investment.
Considering the difficulties of first time entry into a foreign market, the 
ATDC project does seem to make it easier for the companies to enter and 
invest in the host countries, with the assistance and facilitation from both 
the Chinese and host country governments. It is also relatively easier for 
these companies to start separate agribusinesses due to their identity as the 
implementing agents for a government aid project, for instance, in terms of 
land lease or tax exemption. Moreover, it appears that the participation or 
intervention of the Chinese government agency could make a difference as 
to how much an ATDC can exert its influence. The provincial government 
of Hubei, for example, has definitely played a critical role in magnifying the 
platform function of the Mozambican ATDC by establishing contacts and 
forging cooperation between the centre and other companies from Hubei 
province. 
Sustainable Development
The sustainability issue derives from China’s decades-long practice of 
agricultural aid on the continent. As has been widely observed by practi-
tioners and scholars (Shi 1989; Cai 1992; Sun 1996; Zhou and Wang 1997; 
Yun 2000; Bräutigam, 2009), almost all the Chinese agro-aid projects cannot 
escape the following cycle: no matter how successful the initial period of 
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the project proved to be, once the Chinese experts left, the project would 
soon fall into disrepair15. In most cases, the reason for this resides in that 
the aid-recipient countries lacked the financial, managerial and technical 
capability to keep the projects going on their own (Shi 1989; Cai 1992; Sun 
1996; Zhou and Wang 1997). 
Against this background, the sustainability issue was brought to the fore 
in the designing process of the ATDCs (Xu and Qin 2011; Table 3). The em-
phasis on sustainability can be seen from the performance evaluation sys-
tem of the ATDCs, in which the planning and realisation of sustainable de-
velopment occupies 45% of the total scores, more than any other indicators.
Table 3 Evaluation Indicators of the ATDC
Diplomatic 
Influence
Improvement of the 
Agricultural Devel-
opment and Food 
Security of the Host 
Country
Promotion of 
China’s “Agriculture 
Going-out and Invit-
ing-in” Policy
Sustainable Devel-
opment
15% 25% 15% 45%
Source: Made by the authors based on the Evaluation Plan of the ATDC (MOC 
and MOA 2012).
The prescription provided by the Chinese government to ensure a sus-
tainable development of the ATDCs is to incorporate company actors and 
to run the Centres as a business (see ‘Mechanisms’ in Part I). Financially, 
by developing a market-oriented production, based on the ATDCs, it is ex-
pected that the profits earned could be used to finance the daily operations, 
including the realisation of the public-interest functions. In addition, the 
existence of the Chinese company would help maintain the managerial and 
technical sustainability. From what we have seen from the practice, however, 
this plan is not always achievable.
As shown in the Mozambican case, although it did make some business 
attempts, the centre was still not able to achieve financial independence sim-
ply by selling the agro-products. This is despite the fact that the production 
15 Few exceptions exist, for instance, in Mali and Sierra Leone, where the Chinese-aided 
agro-projects during the early years are still operational now. However, in these two countries, 
the projects have been managed by the Chinese whereas the host governments act only as 
shareholders (Jiang, 2016).
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costs had been lowered since the land, water and electricity were provided 
by the host country during the Technical Cooperation Stage (Interview, 14 
Nov 2013). In fact, most of the ATDCs are having the similar constraints: 
limited land, capital and human resources. Therefore, it does not seem very 
likely that the ATDCs will be able to sustain themselves financially through 
business operation, particularly considering the current production scale. 
In order to achieve financial independence, an expansion of investment 
inputs and thus production scale is necessary, either based on the Centre or 
a separate business outside the Centre. This, however, may face challenges 
on two fronts. 
First, how likely is it that the bolt-on investment will be successful? The 
question then is translated into another issue about the feasibility and profit-
ability of conducting agribusiness in Africa. The thorniest problem affecting 
Chinese agro-investors seems to be the financing of investment, given their 
usually limited self-owned capital and difficulties to raise money in China 
(Jiang, 2015). Even if they could manage to raise the required money, they 
would encounter a range of practical problems in the agro-investment pro-
cess in Africa, such as land ownership, labour regulations, market channels, 
government efficiencies, and natural disasters, among others. According to 
existing and potential Chinese agro-investors in Mozambique, the difficul-
ties in operating in Africa were far beyond their expectations before they 
came to the continent, and none of the existing investors have managed 
to make any profits to date after years of operation. This may cast some 
doubts on the prospect of the ATDCs’ commercial development in the host 
countries. 
Second, even if the company could make good profits, to what extent 
would the company support the public-interest functions of the Centre fi-
nancially? Although it is in essence the application of the PPP model in for-
eign aid area, or specifically government-company cooperation in the case 
of the Mozambique and South Africa ATDC, there has not been any con-
crete agreement between the Chinese government and companies, which 
clearly specifies each other’s rights and obligations. It is thus unrealistic to 
expect the company actors to willingly and automatically fulfil the gener-
al public-interest functions of the ATDCs, especially given the generally 
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low profit margins. This leaves the situation uncertain as to whether the 
public-interest functions of the ATDCs would be fully performed in the 
Business Operation Stage as the designers hoped; or, whether it is likely 
that these aid-nature functions will gradually diminish while the ATDCs 
themselves transform into a pure commercial project in the future.
What could be done, then, if the original plan does not seem to be work-
ing? Potentially, the Chinese government could continue to fund the project, 
although it is obviously against the initial intentions of the ATDC design. 
Alternatively, a co-financing model could be adopted, whereby the Chinese 
government will still provide aid grants while the company makes up the 
rest through business expansion. The Mozambican ATDC, for instance, 
seems likely to take this solution (Interview, 29 Dec 2014-b). 
In terms of managerial and technical sustainability, while the immediate 
danger of project failure does seem to be mitigated with the continuing stay 
of the Chinese team, potential problems are still visible. For instance, the 
lack of effective participation of the local partners in the daily management 
of the ATDCs (as seen in the Mozambican case), compounded by the typical 
Chinese-dominated structure of management (as seen in the South African 
case), generates the risk of leaving the local partners incapable of operating 
the Centres independently. Technically, the overwhelmingly farmer-centred 
training model also makes it less likely for the local agro-technicians to con-
duct the extension of Chinese farming techniques on their own.
SECTION V: CONCLUSION AND 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has sought to investigate the objectives, modalities (actors 
and mechanisms) and actual operations of Chinese Agriculture Technology 
Demonstration Centres in Africa. Based on the cases of Mozambique and 
South Africa, the main findings are the following: 
(1) The agro-technology transfer is beneficial but to a limited extent, 
which can be seen, for instance, in the training model, post-training appli-
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cation and different farming cultures. (2) The commercial aim of business 
introduction has been largely achieved: A number of Chinese agro-firms, 
predominantly the project-implementing companies, have made use of the 
ATDCs as an investment platform into African countries and initiated/
planned their agribusiness either based on or separate from the Centres. (3) 
Project sustainability is still a concern within the renewed aid structure. The 
ATDCs do not seem capable of achieving financial independence once the 
start-up capital is depleted. While the managerial and technical sustainabil-
ity seems relatively less urgent, there is still the potential risk of handover 
failure if the Chinese implementing agents pull out prematurely. 
The problems observed above can be largely explained by two aspects. 
First, the drawbacks of the ATDCs stem from a policy design point of view. 
For instance, while the multi-objectives (diplomatic/commercial/sustaina-
ble) of the ATDCs call for a more detailed and delicately designed action 
plan, the existing policy (e.g. ATDC Guidance) is deficient in specificity. 
Particularly pertinent to the point is the design of the Business Operation 
Stage, which is supposed to be the most innovative part of this new ATDC 
project but in reality has been full of ambiguities and uncertainties. In addi-
tion, full consideration of local conditions and adequate feasibility studies 
seem to be lacking in certain instances, as seen by the post-training ap-
plication and farming cultural difference problems as well as the econom-
ically unviable prospect of the Business Operation Stage. Moreover, the 
government-company cooperation model remains unstructured, with the 
responsibilities and rights of the stakeholders largely unclear and thus a 
lack of effective control of the state over the companies in implementing a 
government aid project.
Second, bilateral interactions, both in terms of project planning and 
implementation, between the Chinese government/company actors and 
their African counterparts seems to be ineffective. It is almost impossible 
to devise a perfect policy before implementation; and even if it is possible, a 
given policy would still need to be adapted to the complex and ever-chang-
ing implementation environments – and this is where bilateral interactions 
may play a significant role. The detachment of the technology transfer from 
the host countries’ broader extension systems and the seed-variety selection 
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issue, among others, all point to a lack of effective communications between 
the two sides. The sustainability problem can also be partially attributed to 
the lack of adequate participation of the local actors in the daily operation 
as well as the deficiency of joint efforts between the two governments in 
making plans for the ATDCs’ future development. 
Based on the observations and analyses above, a few policy recommen-
dations for improving the ATDC performances could be provided. (1) The 
Chinese government may need to develop a more detailed and feasible ac-
tion plans for the ATDCs’ Business Operation Stage. It would be particu-
larly helpful to examine a number of ATDCs that have already made their 
initial business attempts during the Technical Cooperation Stage, specifying 
the objective constraints and learning from the previous experiences. (2) A 
more solid arrangement as to the government-company cooperation model 
needs to be initiated, with a view to institutionalizing the companies’ ob-
ligations in delivering government aid projects as well as the supportive 
measures that are meant to be taken by the government. (3) All through the 
planning and implementation of the ATDC project the Chinese government 
should encourage an active participation of their local African counterparts 
in the process, and make concrete measures to facilitate, for instance, a grad-
ual change from the Chinese-dominated management model into a more 
co-operative or localized management model.
There are several limitations to this research. First, the comparative 
cases share the Chinese as instigating agent but the social and legal envi-
ronments in Mozambique and South Africa are distinctively different; and 
while we account implicitly for this, we did not focus exclusively on these 
factors. In addition, we have attempted to draw some general trends from 
our case studies, but surely, only two cases cannot cover the complex dy-
namics of the Chinese ATDCs on the continent. While we did reference 
to other ATDCs and conduct preliminary research on them16, the depth of 
that research is limited and thus we may have omitted important aspects 
– merits or demerits – of the ATDCs. The authors have tried to continue 
and improve the research by incorporating more empirical cases, and also 
16 Mostly based on secondary data and a few of them on informal interviews.
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linking it closer to the theoretical debates in the circle of Public Policy and 
International Development.
In sum, the ATDC project has demonstrated a real effort of the Chinese 
government trying to deliver its agro-aid pledges in Africa in the FOCAC 
era (since the 2000s), and with a particular concern as to avoiding problems 
experienced in China’s earlier agro-aid practice (1960-90s). Yet, given the 
difficulties identified in this paper, it remains to be seen to what extent this 
new programme could be able to overcome ‘old problems’ and thus virtu-
ally benefit the recipient countries. It’s a promising sign for China, as an 
emerging power/donor, to start engaging with international development 
in a more active manner, but much still needs to be done to make this ‘new 
business of development’ work and possibly lead to a true win-win scenario.
REFERENCES
Alden, Chris, 2013. ‘China and the Long March into African Agriculture’. Cahiers Agricul-
tures, 22 (1), 16-21.
Bräutigam, Deborah, 2009.The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Cai, Lingming, 1992. ‘Woguo dui feizhou de nongye yuanzhu’ (China's Agricultural Aid in 
Africa). Guoji jingji hezuo (2), 43–44. 
Chichava, Sérgio, Durán, Jimena and Jiang, Lu, 2014. ‘The Chinese Agricultural Technol-
ogy Demonstration Centre in Mozambique: A Story of a Gift.’ In: Alden, Chris and 
Chichava, Sérgio (eds.), 2014. China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalists. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
FOCAC, 2006. ‘FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2007–2009’. Beijing: FOCAC.
FOCAC, 2009. ‘FOCAC Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan 2010–2012’. Beijing: FOCAC. 
Harding, Angela, 2014, ‘New and Interrelated Facets of Land Acquisition: The Case of the 
Chinese Investments in South Africa’. Master's Thesis (unpublished), University of 
Pretoria.
Jiang, Lu, 2015. ‘Chinese Agricultural Investment in Africa: Motives, Actors and Modalities.’ 
SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 223, October 2015. Johannesburg: SAIIA (South Africa 
Institute of International Affairs).
  - 2016. ‘China's Contemporary Engagement with Africa: the Case of Agriculture’. PhD 
Thesis (unpublished), London School of Economics and Political Science.
MOC and MOA (China), 2011. ‘Guanyu cujin yuanfei nongye jishu shifan zhongxin xiang-
mu kechixu fazhan de zhidaoyijian’ (Guidance on Promoting the Sustainable De-
velopment of the Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre Project in Africa). 
Beijing: MOC and MOA.
[ ] 
35
MOC and MOA, 2012. ‘Yuanfei nongye jishu shifanzhong xinjiance pingjia banfa (shixing)’ 
(Supervision and Evaluation Measures of the Agriculture Technology Demonstration 
Centre in Africa (under trial)). Beijing: MOC and MOA.
Shi, Lin, 1989. Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo (Foreign Economic Cooperation 
of Contemporary China). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. 
Scoones, Ian, Cabral, Lídia and Tugendhat, Henry (eds.), 2013. China and Brazil in African 
Agriculture. Sussex: IDS (Institute of Development Studies).
South African ATDC, 2013.'Proposed Operational Plan of the Agricultural Demonstration 
Centre.’
State Council (China), 2011. ‘White Paper on China's Foreign Aid’. Beijing: State Council.
Sun, Yihou, 1996. ‘Shilun yingxiang nongye yuanwai xiangmu xiaoyi de zhuyao yinsu’ 
(Main Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Agricultural Aid Projects). Guoji jingji 
hezuo (7), 54–56.
Tang, Lixia, Li Xiaoyun and Qi, Gubo, 2014. ‘Zhongguo dui feizhou nongye yuanzhu guanli 
moshi de yanhua yu chengxiao’ (Evolvement and Effectiveness of the Management 
Model of China's Agricultural Aid). Guoji wenti yanjiu(6).
Tang, Xiaoyang, 2013. ‘Zhongguo dui feizhou nongye yuanzhu xingshi de yanbian jiqi 
xiaoguo’ (Evolvement and Effect of Chinese Agricultural Aid in Africa.) Shijie jingji 
yu zhengzhi (5), 55–69.
Xu, Jifeng and Qin, Lu, 2011. ‘Zhongguo yuanzhu feizhou nongye jishu shifan zhongx-
in kechixu fazhan jianyi’ (Suggestions on the Sustainable Development of Chinese 
Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre in Africa). Shijie nongye (12), 87-99.
Yun, Wenju, 2000. ‘Cong guoji yuanzhu de fazhan kan zhongguo duifei nongye yuan-
zhu’ (Development of International Aid and China's Agricultural Aid to Africa). Xiya 
feizhou (2), 17–23.
Zhang, Xiaojun and Zhang, Xi, 2015. ‘Hubei nongken chengdan haiwai yuanzhu xiangmu 
jihaiwai nongye hezuo kaifa xiangmu jianjie’ (Foreign Aid and Overseas Agricultural 
Exploitation Projects Undertaken by Hubei Bureau of State Farm and Land Reclama-
tion). http://www.hubeifarm.com/hwkf/gzjl/3876.htm. Accessed 20 May 2015. 
Zhou, Jianjun and Wang, Qiang, 1997. ‘Xinxingshixia duifei nongye yuanzhu tantao’ (Chi-
na's Agricultural Aid in Africa in the New Era). Guoji jingji hezuo (3), 9–11.
INTERVIEWS
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in South Africa. By Angela Harding. 
Gariep Dam, Free State province, South Africa. 17 Apr 2013.
Interview with van Der Linde, K. By Harding. Gariep Dam. 26 Jul 2013.
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in Mozambique. By Lu Jiang. Boane, 
Maputo province, Mozambique. 18 Oct 2013.
Interview with a Chinese staff A working at the ATDC in Mozambique. By Jiang. Maputo 
city, Mozambique. 4 Nov 2013-a.
Interview with a Chinese staff B working at the ATDC in Mozambique. By Jiang. Boane. 
4 Nov 2013-b.
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in Mozambique. By Jiang. Boane. 8 
Nov 2013.
 The Public SPhere  |  2016 issue
36
Interview with a Mozambican staff working at the MCT. By Lu Jiang and Sérgio Chichava. 
Maputo city. 14 Nov 2013.
Interview with a Chinese staff working for a private Chinese agro-company in Mozam-
bique. By Jiang. Xaixai, Gaza province, Mozambique. 18 Nov 2014.
Interview with a Chinese staff working for a private Chinese agro-company in Mozam-
bique. By Jiang. Maputo city, Mozambique. 29 Dec 2014-a.
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in Mozambique. By Jiang. Boane. 29 
Dec 2014-b.
Interview with a Chinese working for a state-owned Chinese agro-company in Mozam-
bique. By Jiang. Maputo city. 10 Jan 2015.
Interview with a Chinese staff working for a private Chinese agro-company in Mozam-
bique. By Jiang. Buzi, Sofala province, Mozambique. 14 Jan 2015.
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in South Africa. By Jiang and Harding. 
Gariep Dam. 29 Jan 2015.
Interview with a Chinese staff A working at the ATDC in South Africa. By Jiang and Hard-
ing. Gariep Dam. 30 Jan 2015-a.
Interview with a Chinese staff B working at the ATDC in South Africa. By Jiang and Hard-
ing. Gariep Dam. 30 Jan 2015-b.
Interview with the South African farmers working at one of the six government-backed 
fish farms. By Jiang and Harding. Gariep Dam. 30 Jan 2015-c.
Interview with a Chinese staff working at the ATDC in South Africa. By Jiang. [By phone] 
London, UK. 8 Mar 2015.
White Zimbabwe 
farmers and land 
grabbing in Shonga 
of Central Nigeria: 
development or 
dispossession?  
Noah Echa Attah
Professor in the Department of History and 
International Studies Joseph Ayo Babalola University 
Ikeji-Arakeji, Nigeria
